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The evaluation of quality and excellence in science is difficult. We all recognize
a good scientific article when we read it, but it is pretty complicate to express what
“quality” precisely is. It must be said that, over a few centuries of the evolution of
science as an institutional system, the scientific community has discovered practices,
standards, and technologies that can help guide intuition which forms an essential
part of evaluation, toward sound, robust, and socially shared criteria. However, it is
surprising to note that, despite the dramatic increase in figures of science today, in
terms of numbers of articles, journals, research grants, and funding agencies, peer re-
view, which is the essential mechanism of evaluation in science, is poorly understood
in scientific terms.
That said, unlike Michèle Lamont, who is captivated by the social and cultur-
al aspects that mould decisions whenever experts collaborate face to face, I am per-
sonally more interested in understanding the social aspects that make it possible for
peers to successfully cooperate in evaluating scientific products in an anonymous
and decentralised system. Secret rooms where experts evaluate other peers is a social
mechanism that humans discovered many centuries ago, e.g., when political leaders
decide who to nominate as president of a crucial and prestigious public authority, or
when business managers decide who to select for a position upgrade. Peer review, as
we know it in science, is not just this: group deliberation. Rather, it is an anonymous,
distributed and decentralised mechanism that makes the evaluation of complex sci-
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entific products possible through impersonal cooperation among different figures,
by means of specific social norms.
My contribution to this symposium is to examine the social mechanisms behind
peer review, by providing a complementary view of Michèle Lamont’s book that em-
phasizes the need for a more general outlook at the basic process of evaluation in
science and the added value of modelling to investigate this topic [Lamont 2009].
In particular, I will introduce recent experimental findings that help us to illuminate
certain aspects of peer review, in particular the relevance of social norms that regu-
late the evaluation process, the weakness of social sanctions in peer review, and the
counterproductive effect of economic incentives on reviewers. By emphasizing the
sociological perspective rather than “behind the scene” of experts’ dark rooms, I
think sociology can contribute more to the recent debate about peer review reform.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section elaborates on Michèle
Lamont’s book, by illustrating a complementary viewpoint that looks more gen-
erally at peer review and evaluation. The second section summarises the puzzle
of peer review, by suggesting why it is so important and so disputed today. The
third introduces recent experimental findings that help to understand the core
mechanism of peer review, such as the interplay of incentives and moral norms
for cooperation between the social figures involved in evaluation. As we will see,
the experimental literature provides fundamental insights to understand why so-
cial sanctions, pivotal to support cooperation, are poorly exploited in peer review
at present. My position is that it is more important to focus on these aspects
by keeping a general outlook to evaluation in science, rather than discussing the
unavoidable and abiding heterogeneity and difference in evaluation standards be-
tween disciplines. The experimental insights have also policy implications suggest-
ing the inadvisability of offering material incentives to guarantee a more stable
and productive peer review. As we will see, it is reasonable to expect that mon-
etary incentives can backfire and undermine the moral motives that sustain peer
review.
xConcerning Lamont’s Study on Scientific Evaluation
How Professors Think by Michèle Lamont is a brilliant example of empirical
investigation on evaluation in science and the role of cognitive and social factors in
making scientific quality and excellence possible. It provides a detailed account on
what happens in expert panels, when scientists are called to negotiate evaluations
about proposals in a multi-disciplinary context. It puts the rationality of peer review
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under the spot light, by emphasizing the role of emotion, rhetoric arguments, and
other cognitive aspects in group decision making. In doing so, this book pays good
service to the sociological approach to these issues, in particular from a constructivist
and cultural perspective. It argues that scientific quality and excellence are the re-
sult of complex social processes, rather than being “objective” and standardizable
outcomes.
This is far from being a trivial issue, at least in sociology. The relevance of peer
review and quality evaluation for the advancement of science is without doubt rele-
vant, and evaluation and peer review are obviously influenced by significant social
aspects, such as moral norms and reputational incentives, which are by definition
sociological topics. Notwithstanding this, there have been few sociological investiga-
tions on this topic so far.
At the beginning of June 2010, I looked at 47 sociology journals listed in JSTOR,
which included the most influential journals in our discipline, such as The American
Sociological Review or The American Journal of Sociology. It was frustrating to note
that articles on peer review in sociology could be counted on the fingers of one hand
and that none of them crucially touched the present debate. This is treated better in
biomedical sciences, physics or engineering. Therefore, Lamont’s book is welcomed
since it suggests a careful, detailed and vivid analysis that positions sociology investi-
gations within a core and disputed issue.
That said, Lamont’s book has certain limitations, the most important of which
are: a) it covers only one specific point of the scientific evaluation continuum, being
focussed on evaluation of fellowship proposals by students in the humanities and
social sciences; b) it restricts sociological investigations to the disclosure of “behind
the scene” aspects of evaluation, rather than locating sociology at the core of the
peer review mechanism. These critical points are of paramount importance also to
understand the peculiarity of the social technology illustrated in the book (group
deliberation by panelists). I will discuss these two points.
Firstly, my understanding is that evaluating scientific proposals is like evaluating
business start-ups in innovative and competitive markets. The challenge for evalua-
tors is to correctly predict a development process that requires a synergy of different
aspects, e.g., personal and professional qualities of applicants, support and quality
of their research environment, achievement of relevant data that support applicant’s
investigations, and the prospective impact of their potential scientific achievements.
By looking at the evaluation process from the evaluators’ angle, information asym-
metries and uncertainty make it difficult to estimate in advance the future impact of
any proposal. The point is that the same is not true when evaluation is focused on
scientific output, such as journal articles [Baccini 2010, 38]. In these cases, the object
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of evaluation is scientific output that can be subject to peer scrutiny in a less biased
and uncertain way.
This makes me suggest that Lamont’s evidence is to be framed in a more gen-
eral model of scientific evaluation that captures the whole continuum of science de-
velopment. In my view, scientific research is to be viewed as a single process com-
posed of different stages that generate different products. In each stage, peer review
is involved through different social technologies that guarantee quality evaluation.
Although it can take different forms, the mechanism is the same: quality evaluation is
not exercised by agencies external to science, such as political institutions, taxpayers’
political representatives or private companies, but by peers, who are mostly called
to spend time and energy and provide their opinion not for strictly economic or ma-
terial interests.
For the sake of simplicity, I suggest we assume three stages and three dif-
ferent scientific products in a continuum between input and output science sys-
tem functions: funding (input), conference/meeting/workshops/presentations/pa-
pers (throughput), journal articles and publication (output). These phases have com-
plex temporal interrelations, such as the influence of output (publications) on input
(funding). More importantly, they entail different evaluation process and peer review
technologies, the general purpose of peer review to guarantee the best allocation of
resources in the science system (e.g., funds, reputation, and careers) being under-
stood. Each stage of this process poses different challenges to evaluation. Let me
briefly summarise some of them.
The funding stage can be applied to careers (e.g., PhD bourses, fellowship
grants, and scientific leaders’ recruitment), research proposals (e.g., experimental,
basic, or applied research) or university structures (e.g., labs, and departments). The
challenge for evaluation here, in particular in the case of fellowship grants or research
proposals for young researchers, is to predict the value of the applicants and proposals
in terms of excellence and future achievement, in presence of relevant information
asymmetries and difficult research outcome predictability. The rule is “the more you
know about the applicant, the better it is” (e.g., CV, past publications, and reference
letters), any personal information about applicants being pivotal to understand their
potential achievement rather than a possible bias introduced into the evaluation, as
occurs when evaluation deals with scientific outputs, e.g., submitted articles. Here,
the most suitable evaluation technology is the expert panel (perhaps supported by
anonymous peer review), in particular in case of multidisciplinary proposals like those
illustrated in the Lamont’s book.
This is because: a) funding agencies have little knowledge of the scientific envi-
ronment and research fields, as well as of the individual skills of the potential experts,
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and inadequate internal competence, so that it is impossible that they can rely on, and
adequately manage decentralised and impersonal peer review; b) the outsourcing of
evaluation to a restricted group of experts guarantees an alignment of interests be-
tween the “principal” (the funding agency) and the “agent” (the expert) around the
funding agencies’ objectives, so that a common modus operandi and shared guide-
lines and priorities are established that can guide the evaluation process; c) the rela-
tionship between funding agencies and restricted groups of experts guarantees the
legitimacy of the evaluation and sharing responsibility for funding decisions better
than other mechanisms, such as unilateral evaluation by funding agencies or anony-
mous, distributed and decentralized peer review.
This said, evaluation and peer review for research funding are far from being
a “perfect” and “efficient” social mechanism. As suggested by the literature, the crit-
ical points are as follows: a) the panellist group decision can be biased in many re-
spects (e.g., “old boyism”, gender, nationality, or language) [e.g., Coates et al. 2002;
Bornmann and Daniel 2005] and in particular its collective dimension can even re-
inforce these cognitive biases ([e.g., Kerr and Tindale 2004; Obrecht, Tibelius, and
D’Aloisio 2007; Benda and Engels 2010]1; b) if allowed, external reviewers unlike a
panel of experts do not always have a sufficient frame to evaluate proposals [e.g.,
Bornmann and Daniel 2005], so that they generate noise in the evaluation process;
c) although relatively cheap for funding agencies, if taken as the only mechanism to
allocate resources, funding through grants tends to cause the so-called “grant ma-
nia,” generating excessive costs for the system in terms of decreased productivity
[e.g., Goldsworty 2009]. The literature has suggested reforms to solve these critical
points, among which the adoption of “the reader system” (i.e., evaluators read all
the submissions in their field, not just one) that is expected to reduce these biases
[e.g., Jayasinghe, Marsh, and Bond 2006] and the abolition of complex peer review
group decision in favour of distributive funding, to maintain productivity caused by
the “grant mania” [e.g., Spier 2002b; Gordon and Poulin 2009]. The debate is still
open on this point.
The case of publications and scientific outputs in general is different. Here,
the evaluation aims to guarantee that only excellent/high quality research work gets
published. The challenge for reviewers is to evaluate research work in presence of
x
1 The literature cited in the text provides a perspective on evaluation biases different from
Lamont’s. Lamont [2009, 158] emphasizes that “the fact that panelists must convince one another
of the value of a proposal certainly contributes to their belief in the legitimacy of the process. In
contrast, evaluations of journal submissions are conducted in the privacy of a reviewer’s office or
home and are not ‘defended publicly’. This may leave more room for greater personal arbitrariness.”
The contributions cited in the text point out that committees and group panels tend to develop
particularistic cultures that can even exacerbate shared cognitive biases.
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relevant information asymmetries, in particular on data sources. Unlike evaluation
for funding, here the “impersonality” and the absolute invisibility of authors are of
paramount importance: the rule, in this case, is “the less you know about the author,
the better it is” (e.g., anonymous article submission, avoiding cross-references). Giv-
en the unequal distribution of knowledge in the community, the increasing sophis-
tication of research contents, the specialisation of the knowledge and the research
technologies, as well as the increasing amount of research products in the science
market (e.g., journals and books, see below), the only social technology that can
guarantee a suitable evaluation is anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer
review.
Also here, several problems arise. Let us assume that the goal of journal editors
is to maximise the number of high-level articles published in each issue, to increase
the reputation of their journals. On the other hand authors want to maximise their
publications and in particular those in top-level journals, given time and resources
constraints (the same assumptions could be made for the interaction between con-
ference chairs and submission authors). Given that editors cannot manage the eval-
uation either themselves or by restricted groups of specialists, due to the increased
complexity of research technologies and specialisation, all evaluation rests upon the
capacity of the editors to have as complete a knowledge as possible of the scientific
domains of reviewers. This is difficult and so editors suffer from imperfect knowledge
of potential reviewers and information asymmetries on the quality of the reviews re-
ported. Coordination problems arise as it is unlikely that each article submission is
paired with the best expert in the field, so that evaluation can also suffer from an
editor’s knowledge biases. Discussions about how to reform the reviewers’ selection
process exploiting information and communication technologies, by reducing the
gate keeping role of editors and promoting more open and bottom-up self-organisa-
tion of matching submissions and reviewers are under way. However, at present the
problems are squarely on the editors’ shoulders and take place behind closed doors
[e.g., Gura 2002].
Secondly, it must be said that the biases referred to panellists’ group decision
mentioned above can also influence anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer
review. Moreover, unlike the former case, reviewers sometimes do have poor contex-
tual knowledge of the journal and its typical journal readership, so that they tend to
overemphasize irrelevant specific aspects or under-emphasize important ones. More-
over, reviewers (in particular those with good reputation) are often overloaded and
time and resource devoted to reviewing conflict with time and resource dedicated
to publishing [Henderson 2001]. A survey conducted in 2007 on a sample of 3.000
scientists showed that most active reviewers (presumably the better ones) were over-
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loaded and covered about 80% of all reviews, with an average of 14 reviews per year
[Ware 2007].
Since reputational incentives for reviewing are low compared with publishing
or with other scientific activities (e.g., grant competition, or presidency of important
scientific institutions), scientists probably prefer to allocate time to other competing
activities. It must be said that scientists’ pay-offs, as presently settled, do not put re-
viewing top of the list. On the other hand, since reviewing is a private affaire between
editors and reviewers with low probabilities of social sanctioning from others, cheat-
ing editors (e.g., returning back reports of a few lines that provide neither precise
justification for the evaluation, nor insights for authors) is not a risky strategy for
reviewers. As a matter of fact, if you cheat an editor, nobody knows it apart from
the editor!2
These are aspects on which we will return in the third section when we focus on
certain experiments. The point here is that, in my view, it is possible to understand
many general implications of evaluation and peer review in the sciences, as well as the
heterogeneity of peer review technologies, just if a general perspective on evaluation
is adopted. And so, it does not matter whether evaluation is done in sociology, physics
or biology.
A second limitation of Lamont’s book lies in its cultural perspective. My under-
standing is that, in case Lamont’s perspective is viewed as the real and sole way of
sociologically investigating evaluation in science, the risk is of a retreat of sociology
into the disclosure of “behind the scene” aspects, leaving generalisation and policy
implications to other scientists and so marginalising our discipline. This is the reason
why I would like to suggest a more general approach to understand the relevance
of incentives, moral norms and social practices that guide evaluation. I believe this
point is crucial to place sociology in the current debate on peer review and its reform,
which is so urgent today.
xThe Tangled Puzzle of Peer Review
Peer review is the cornerstone of science, the origin of which dates back to 1.752
when the Royal Society of London obtained responsibility for the “Philosophical
x
2 It is likely that in small and cohesive academic communities social control and sanctions are
stronger and therefore reviewers’ cheating is risky. On the other hand, it is reasonable to suppose that
in those communities the anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer review loses its strength in
favour to other evaluation mechanisms. However, the presence of large and dispersed communities
that compete at the global level is the present picture of scientific research, where standard peer
review is fundamental and the problems mentioned in the text are important.
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Transactions” [Spier 2002a]. It guarantees the quality of science by institutionalising
the Mertonian value of “organised scepticism” [Merton 1973]. It is fundamental for
institutional agencies to discriminate research proposals and decide which ones are
worth funding, as well as for universities and research institutes to recruit the highest
quality research staff. It is fundamental for scientists to increase the quality of their
work, e.g., collecting referee reports, or peers’ opinion during a conference. It is
fundamental for conference chairs and journal editors to guarantee the best quality
of presentations and articles and the reputation of their conferences or journals. As
such, it is the pillar on which all the resources of the science market, such as funds,
reputation and careers, are based [Smith 2006]. Therefore, it is also fundamental
for policy makers to guarantee that tax payers or research fund investors are putting
money into a credible system.
Peer review allows us to manage an increasingly sophisticated and complex
scientific environment. In recent decades, the tremendous expansion of specific top-
ics, interdisciplinary research and the increasing technical sophistication of research
methods and tools have been reflected in the growing numbers of journals, confer-
ences, and funding agencies for science, as well as in the continuous stratification of
the scientific community into a mosaic of specialties. This is why individuals who are
in charge of evaluating scientific products, such as journal editors, conference chairs
and those responsible for research funds, strongly rely on peer review to guarantee
time and quality of the evaluation, as they are “held hostage by the limited knowledge
and relative ignorance of a single mind in this complex scientific system” [Grainger
2007, 5200].
Let us take Nature, one of the leading scientific journals in general, as an ex-
ample. Nature formally established peer reviewing in 1953 and now receives about
10.000 papers every year. Its peer reviewing allows to end with about 7% of submis-
sions eventually published and it is of paramount importance to maintain the high
reputation of the journal. For conferences, a good example is AAMAS, a particular-
ly successful multi-disciplinary annual conference on multi-agent systems, with no
more than 10 years of history. It receives about 1.000 submissions annually from a
varied set of authors, ranging from computer to cognitive scientists, from anthropol-
ogists to sociologists. Through an efficient web-based peer review system, where each
submission has a responsible chair, reviewers are allowed to negotiate evaluations
in case of conflict and authors to respond to their anonymous reviewers, AAMAS
is capable of assigning conference slots to about 30% of submissions, guaranteeing
the highest quality. For institutional agencies, one of the most influential examples is
the National Institutes of Health of the US Government, which invest over USD 31
billion annually in medical research, 80% of it awarded through competitive grants
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based on peer review. The maximum quality is guaranteed by a stringent selection,
with 20-25% of the proposal eventually granted.
Notwithstanding all this, peer review has attracted its share of criticism. Since
the late 1980s, a survey of members of the Scientific Research Society revealed that
only 8% of interviewees agreed that peer review worked well as it was [Chubin and
Hackett 1990]. In recent years, the criticism has been fuelled by some scandals that
also gained public notoriety. In 1996, Social Text published a paper where the author,
Alan Sokal, a physicist, intentionally introduced false sentences. Sokal’s intention was
to parody the seriousness of post-modernism as a new paradigm for social sciences.
Reviewers took this parody as a serious piece of science and the journal published it.
In 1997 the editors of the British Medical Journal intentionally inserted eight errors
into a short paper and asked reviewers to identify the mistakes. Out of 221 reviewers,
the median number spotted was two [Couzin 2006]. In recent years, a Norwegian
study published in The Lancet was found to be based on imaginary patients [Mar-
ris 2006]. But, the biggest impact was reached by the stem cell scandal caused by
a group of scientists from South Korea who published in 2005 a paper in Science
based on false data. Under the principle of “aggressively seeking firsts” that often
influences leading journals and dazzled by the supposed novelties of the paper, the
nine reviewers selected by Science took just 58 days to positively evaluate the paper,
slightly more swiftly than the average of 81 days typical for this influential journal
[Couzin 2006, 23-24].
These events triggered several disputes on peer review reforms, such as: whether
and how to detect fraud and misconducts through peer reviewing [Nature 2006];
how to more intensively use new information technologies to improve communica-
tion during the reviewing process [Mandviwalla, Patnayakuni, and Schuff 2008]; how
to combine peer review and bibliometric methodologies to provide public agencies
with more detailed methods to evaluate research proposals [Abramo, D’Angelo, and
Caprasecca 2009]; whether to reduce the fragmentation of publications, the prolif-
eration of journals and the side-effect of the “publish or perish” rule [de Carvalho
2006; Dost 2008]; whether and how to pass from authorship to contributorship rule
to clarify and increase of accountability of an individual scientist’s contribution [Cho,
McGee, and Magnus 2006]; how to promote training initiatives on the ethical issues
of reviewing at the doctoral and post-doctoral level [Bosetti and Toscano 2008].
More radical analysts argued that these scandals confirmed that peer review
was nothing but a black box [Smith 1997, 2006]. A survey conducted at the end of
the 1990s in clinical neurosciences indicated that agreement between reviewers as
to whether manuscripts should be accepted, revised or rejected was not significantly
greater than expected by chance alone [Rothwell and Martyn 2000]. A survey in a
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cardiovascular journal conducted on data between 1997 and 2002 indicated a strong
correlation between the ratings of the reviewers and the impact factor of the pub-
lished papers [Opthof, Coronel, and Janse 2002], so prospective peer review errors
can largely amplify their impact in the community. Quoting evidence from the Na-
tional Science Board on the quality of the US research between the 1980s and the
1990s, Henderson [2001] argued that taxpayer-sponsored peer review science bene-
fited from growing investment but the quality of output showed a clear degradation.
In his view, this could be explained by the conflict of interest of reviewers who, being
forced to invest time and energy for their publications, did not spend more than three
hours to return their evaluation report to the journals.
By relying on the case of peer reviewing in funding agencies like the Nation-
al Science Foundation, Spier [2002b] argued that peer review could even prevent
funding for really innovative projects and ended up suggesting allocating funds by
random or by following social priorities determined by lay panels. Innovation can
be prevented because of cognitive biases of reviewers reported in an empirical study
by Travis and Collins [1991] called “old boyism” (“old boys” network of reviewers
tend to promote conservative research) and “cronyism” or “particularism” (review-
ers affected by cognitive similarity tend to promote similar researches). These bias-
es were particularly evident when peer review took place for funding agencies with
the consequence that innovative proposals were often penalized [Mayo et al. 2006].
Horrobin [2001] argued that “a process that is central to the scientific endeavour as
peer review has no validated experimental base” and that it refuses open scrutiny.
We will come back to this point later, because it is of paramount importance. Spier’s
position follows certain arguments pointed out by Lamont [2009] as well. It ques-
tions the superiority of anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer review as a
social mechanism to endogenously determine the science pay-offs and spontaneously
guarantee research coordination.
To sum up, recently, peer review and scientific research evaluation have be-
come a hot issue. This is for two reasons, which seem paradoxically in contrast with
each other: 1) recent scandals about peer review failures and inefficiencies within the
scientific community, and 2) the increasing emphasis on peer review and research
evaluation in the society and the economy in general. On the one hand, it seems that
within science, peer review has been increasingly criticised and, according to many
also influential observers, a reform of it is needed [e.g., Alberts, Hanson, and Kelner
2008]. This is a reaction against the over-confidence that peer review was a perfect
social mechanism that automatically prevented individual frauds and errors and allo-
cated resources (funds, reputation, academic carriers) within science perfectly com-
petitively. On the other hand, public and private institutional agencies that invest in
Sociologica, 3/2010
11
scientific research and society in general, have great expectations in the thaumatur-
gical features of peer review to guarantee perfect allocation of scientific resource, as
well as possibly other fields.
On this point, two aspects are of particular importance. Firstly, apart from ide-
alistic representations, science is a largely “imperfect,” extremely complex, and con-
stantly increasing system, that rests upon moral norms and social practices, the self-
reproduction, stability and good functioning of which are delicate and difficult to
maintain. Secondly, the present complexity of the science landscape and the increas-
ing competitiveness among scientists sees the moral norms and social practices that
sustain peer review and quality evaluation ever more under attack.
To elaborate these two points, it is important to look at the science market and
to what science has become today. In my view, most of the problems of peer review
are in fact due to the increasing decentralized competition that regulates science in
many respects; from research grants to tenures, from university appeal to journal
publications. Although consubstantial to science progress, this increasing decentral-
ized competition poses relevant challenges to peer review being an inescapable aspect
of it, especially if some dramatic imperfections in the market mechanism are taken
into account. I will focus on two aspects of this competition: the journal publishing
market and the research grant market.
The figures of the market for scientific publication are impressive. The core
scientific, technical and medicine publishing market was estimated between USD 7
and 11 billion, with journal prices increasing 200%-300% beyond inflation in the
period 1975-1995, before the large diffusion of the Internet and the digital libraries.
In their answer to a UK House of Commons’ committee in 2004, Elsevier estimated
that the 2.000 publishers in science, technology and medicine published 1.2 million
peer-review articles annually. A recent survey has estimated that peer-reviewed sci-
entific journal articles published world-wide in 2006 were approximately 1.346.000,
with 70% covered by the ISI [Björk, Roos and Lauri 2009]. An estimate of the annual
growth of this old and mature market was 3.5% yearly. From the 1970s to the 1990s,
the growth in journals and publications has basically followed the growth in scientists
and the public funding of science in general [e.g., Mabe and Amin 2001].
The point is that the publishing market is far from being a “perfect market”
[European Commission 2006]. There are particular reasons for this. The market has
been historically supported by public funds in different parts of its chain value, such
as author and referee time and journal purchases. This negatively affected the strength
of market selection. Since producers (authors) and consumers (readers) are the same
subjects (researchers), the private and social values of the exchanged good may differ,
when researchers behave respectively as authors or readers. The market chain value
Squazzoni, Peering Into Peer Review
12
has been controlled by intermediaries so far, such as journal publishers and libraries,
which have relevant information asymmetries toward producers and consumers but
can influence both as well. The electronic era has dramatically exacerbated this situ-
ation, starting a race for size through dramatic hierarchical concentration or mergers
on the publishers’ side [McCabe 2002].
This has weakened the price sensitivity of consumers, introducing relevant bi-
ases in the market. Since authors want to publish in high impact journals, which at-
tract other good potential authors and high interest from readers, the readers want
good journals and easily identify the best ones, to avoid excessive selection costs (e.g.,
search for journals). In turn, journals can acquire reputational signals that might in-
fluence both authors and readers. Through the certification process, the market can
present relevant barriers to entry and fall under the “Matthew effect,” that is, a high
inflation rates for best titles. Moreover, the market has been populated by different
types of subjects so far, such as learned societies that manage a small number of highly
successful long-standing journals, sold for low prices, as well as for profit publishers
that have given new impetus to scientific publishing, by introducing new journals on
average of lower quality and sold at much higher prices [European Commission 2006,
32]. The features of this market affect what is published and read and can deform
the reliability of evaluation.
If we look at the research grant market, we find a similar competitive environ-
ment that can also have potential negative consequences on science. The journal pub-
lishing market guarantees at least the presence of exploitative niches for non-stan-
dard research, e.g., the possibility to publish innovative articles in less established or
more specialised journals. The research grant market, based on centralized funding
agencies and competitive bidding, is much more selective and takes up a relevant part
of researchers’ everyday work. For instance, a report on the “grant making mania”
in biomedical sciences in US stated that, at the University of Pennsylvania, School
of Medicine, faculty members spent more than 50 percent of their time working on
grants [Schaffer 2009]. This is common to most faculty members in many experimen-
tal/applied sciences, but also increasingly diffuse in social sciences and humanities
[Link, Swann, and Bozeman 2008].
Many reports allow us to reasonably suppose that competing bidding on re-
search proposals causes a ratio of selection similar to the case of the National Insti-
tutes of Health of the US Government, i.e., about 25-30%, with impressive waste
of resources, in terms of time and energy dedicated to writing failed proposals. An
incredible example of wasted resources caused by this “grant mania” was the FIRB
2008 grant addressed to young PhD students and researchers (below 39 years) in
all scientific fields by the Minister of University and Research in 2009 in Italy. For
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EUR 45 million allocated through competitive bidding, 105 proposals were selected
against 3.792 proposals, i.e., a ratio of less than 3% of successful proposals!
 This evidence puts a spotlight on the economic efficiency of peer reviewed
competitive research grant markets for taxpayers and investors and supports reform
proposals. For instance, using statistics from the Natural Science and Engineering
Research Council Canada, Gordon and Poulin [2009] calculated that the cost of
preparing grant applications in 2007 exceeded that of giving every qualified inves-
tigators a conspicuous direct basic grant, guaranteeing at the same time the quali-
ty of applicants by already available reputational markers, such as university hiring,
promotion and tenure proceedings, published articles and patents, whose collective
scrutiny far exceeded the cost of grant peer review.
However this may be, the point is that these markets, as well as the entire sci-
ence market, are not just “imperfect” from an economic point of view. Of course,
this would not be a surprise, since we know very well the imperative of imperfect
markets in many sectors of the economy and society. The point is that the reliability
of these markets as science resource allocation mechanisms is based on certain social
practices that do not fully respond to economic incentives and are not economic at
all, therefore being largely unpredictable. Peer review has primarily a normative basis
that is often taken for granted, as if it were self-reproducible, robust against external
perturbations, and largely predictable social mechanism. This is not so. At this point,
the question is: do we have scientific evidence of social mechanism that matters to un-
derstand evaluation and peer review? The next section aims to answer this question.
xPeer Review under the Microscope
In my view, modelling and formalisation are pivotal to investigate specific and
concrete social mechanisms that regulate social interaction, in that they allow us to
capture essential aspects of it and to analyze its macro implications for large and more
complex social systems. My suggestion is to view peer review in general as a triadic
interaction between three figures, e.g., editors (or funding agencies or conference
chairs), authors (or proposal applicants), and reviewers. Their cooperation is essential
to guarantee good and effective evaluation, as well as positive outcomes to society in
terms of knowledge advance, effective technologies, and new products for a very di-
verse range of users (e.g., medical treatment for patients, new recipes for policy mak-
ers etc.). The fact that this peer interaction is regulated by anonymous, distributed
and decentralized mechanisms guarantees that science pay-offs are endogenously de-
termined. Research guidelines, priorities and methods are experimentally defined, in
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that they follow trial and error learning mechanisms involving the whole scientific
community and not centralized exogenous planning decision. In this, there is a close
analogy between the logics of market and that of science.
Together with some colleagues, I recently conducted some laboratory experi-
ments designed to frame this triadic interaction as a cooperation problem under un-
certainty and trust situations, where conflicting interests, cheating and moral hazard
are possible. We started from the so-called “investment game,” a common exper-
imental framework used by psychologists, economists, and sociologists, particular-
ly suitable to frame certain important social mechanisms that explain how coopera-
tion emerges among rational agents under uncertainty and trust situations [e.g. Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing 2000].
Figure 1 shows a typical investment game [Barrera 2008]. This game models
a typical social interaction where ego was called to trust alter and alter to honour
trust. The rules of the game are simple. Each round, participants are coupled and
randomly assigned to two different roles, called player A (the investor) and player B
(the trustee). Both players receive an initial endowment, E1 and E2 expressed in ECU
(experimental currency unit) with a fixed exchange rate in real money. First, player A
(the investor) has to decide whether to send all, some, or none of his/her endowment
to player B (the trustee), keeping for him/herself the rest, if any. The amount sent by
A, denoted M1, is multiplied by a factor m by the experimenter (in most cases, m =
3) and sent to the trustee, in addition to the endowment. The parameter m should be
interpreted as the returns the player B made due to the investment of player A. Then,
player B decides whether to return to A all, some, or none of the amount received.
The amount returned by player B (the trustee), denoted K2, is not multiplied. Each
round ends with the payoffs respectively communicated to the players. Each round,
the payoff earned by player A (V1) is:
x
V1 = E1 M1 + K2
x
whereas the payoff earned by player B (V2) is:
x
V2 = E1 + mM1 K2.
x
indicates the extent to which the investor trusted the trustee and is a kind
of measure of the degree of trust. K2 represents the extent to which the trustee is
trustworthy and is a kind of measure of the degree of trustworthiness [ibidem, 10-11].




The game is called the “investment game” since the rule of multiplying the
amount sent by the investor implies that a) the investor deals with the uncertainty of
paying a cost at the beginning of the interaction to possibly gain higher revenues at
the end, and b) the trustee has a return from the investor’s decision.
FIGURE 1. The Investment Game.
Source: Barrera [2008, 9].
Following Keser’s example [2003], we modified this famous game to include
evaluation by third-parties (i.e., reviewers), by modelling a situation similar to the
process of submissions’ evaluation in scientific journals. We called it “Third-Party
Investment Game” and we tested it with a population of 126 students recruited
through public announcement in various faculties of the University of Brescia [Boero
et al. 2009b]. All game interactions took place through a computer network and the
subjects were unable to identify their counterparts. The subjects played 25 periods
in all and were informed in advance of the duration of the game and the exchange
rate of the experimental currency units (ECU) , with 1 ECU = 1.5 Euro cents. The
game took nearly one hour (including instructions) and the average earning was 15
Euros, which was paid immediately after the experiment.
The rules of the game were as follows: 1) subjects were randomly assigned as A,
B, and C players each period (they played on average the same number of period in
each role at the end of the game); A was the investor, B the trustee, and C the evaluator
(third party); 2) player A (the investor) received an endowment of 10 experimental
Squazzoni, Peering Into Peer Review
16
currency units (ECU); 3) A decided how much to send to B (the trustee) between
0 and 10; 4) B received the amount sent by A tripled plus an endowment of 10
experimental currency units (ECU); 5) B decided how much to return to A; 6) the
sums earned by both players in the current period were displayed to both subjects; 7)
C observed the amount exchanged between A and B and assigned a reputation score
to B (“neutral”, “positive”, or “negative”). This score was made available between
step 2 and 3 to the next A player who interacted with the B player who had been
rated. In case of no rating available, e.g., when players had not yet played in a B’s
role, as in the initial periods, the player appeared to the counterpart as “unknown”.
It will not pass unnoticed that this interaction is similar to what happens be-
tween editors, authors, and reviewers in science. Editors, as investors, should deal
with information asymmetries in respect to authors’ submissions (and to reviewers
reliability and competence) and with the uncertainty of providing room for unwor-
thy articles that might negatively influence the reputation of their journals, whereas
loosing good ones. Authors should evaluate whether to cooperate with editors by
guaranteeing that their submissions contain true data, have been released after seri-
ous research investment and so on, while they are tempted to cheat by reducing the
unit cost per submission, e.g., by adopting economies of scales on research findings.
Evaluators should guarantee editors’ investment by evaluating authors’ submissions,
in absence of monetary or reputational incentives and competing at the same time
for submissions with authors against editors. Although our experimental game mir-
rors an abstract interaction that misses out many behavioural motives and social con-
straints that can have an influence in the empirical reality, these analogies convinced
me that our “third-party investment game” embodies at least certain essential aspects
of peer review as a social institution3.
The result of our experiment was that by introducing third-party evaluation,
cooperation dramatically increased [ibidem]. This confirmed the original findings
of Keser [2003]. Her results showed that the effect was stronger for the trustees
(+41.5% of returns in respect to the baseline treatment, without any evaluation) than
for the investors (+31.5%). Our results show that third-party evaluation provides
even more room for reputational investment strategies by trustees. In addition to
this, we introduced evaluation on both sides, both on investors and trustees and both
before and after the investment decision [Boero et al. 2009a]. Even when cheating
did not create any reputational sanction, the evaluation of trustees being known to
x
3 Of course, my position starts from the assumption that modelling and abstraction are quintessen-




investors after the investment decision, the fact of being under evaluation by others
tended to increase the reliability of trustees and thereby the investors’ risk attitude.
These results indicate that a significant part of trustees’ behaviour is not explicable
simply as rational investment in reputation. More specifically, besides the obviously
strong effect of rational reputation seeking, we found that third-party evaluation also
matters when the observed behaviour can only be based on cognitive mechanisms
akin to the ones that become apparent in the famous “eyespot” experiments.
Indeed, Haley and Fessler [2005] found that the presence of stylized eyespots
on the computer desktop used for experimental sessions significantly increases the
generosity of players in a dictator game despite no differences in actual anonymity. In
another work, conducted in a real-world setting, Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts [2006]
found a similar effect of apparently unimportant cues of being watched. Their results
show that people put nearly three times as much money in a “honesty box,” used
to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room, when the cost of the drinks
was displayed on a board along with a picture of eyes staring at the consumer than
when the notice included a flower control picture. Of course, the effects of those
mechanisms are less uniformly distributed among subjects, but are still noticeable at
the aggregate level.
The point is that these experiments show that we are sensitive to other people’s
judgment, by believing that other opinions can have dramatic consequences in the
future even when these are largely unpredictable. This is the reason why peer eval-
uation, even when anonymous as in our experiment and in science, motivates co-
operation beyond rational expectations. But, this is particularly true when the re-
sults of the evaluation and thereby personal reputation, circulate within the social
system. The condition is that interaction triggers some information about subjects’
past behaviour. If this is true, the point is that evaluation in science, as presently
performed, triggers only good reputation of contributors (e.g., publications, price
announcements), whereas reviewers and their evaluation are covered by secrecy. The
fact that reviews are not published, nor are they shared among journals, not only
increases the cost of reviewing at the system level (e.g., multiple reviews of the same
submission), but makes sanctions weaker against unfair reviewers and does not make
reviewing a reputational credit for good reviewers [e.g., Alberts, Hanson, and Kelner
2008].
If this is true, the next step is to tackle the question: could monetary incentives
reinforce the strength of the evaluation and thereby cooperation between the three
figures involved? To answer this question, we designed a new experiment similar to
the former that introduced monetary incentives to the evaluators, tested on a popu-
lation of 108 students.
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We introduced three new treatments to the previous game, where monetary in-
centives were added to evaluators: a) fixed monetary incentives; b) incentives aligned
to investors’ interests, and c) incentives aligned to trustees’ interest [for details, see
Boero, Bravo, and Squazzoni 2010]. It is worth noting that, in treatment b), our
“third-party investment game” created a typical principal-agent model. In this case,
the rational choice literature dictates that monetary incentives are pivotal to motivat-
ing trustees to act on investors’ behalf, by guaranteeing that the self-interest of the
former coincides with the objectives of the latter. This is the situation that models
peer review supported by material incentives to the reviewers, as suggested by Hauser
and Fehr [2007] among others.
Contrary to any rational choice prediction, monetary incentives caused less co-
operation than before (i.e., when there were no incentives for evaluators), no matter
whether fixed or aligned and no matter who they were aligned to. The fact that mater-
ial interests can undermine moral motives has been found in a number of experiments
[e.g., Gintis et al. 2005; Bowles 2008]. A recent theory called “motivation crowding
theory” has been elaborated that accounts for a broad range of empirical phenomena
where external interventions, such as monetary incentives or fines, might undermine
intrinsic pro-social motivation and lower cooperation [e.g., Frey and Jegen 2001].
In our case, the reason why monetary incentives backfired is that the credibility of
the evaluation by third-parties was damaged in the authors’ eyes, since evaluation
was perceived as subjected to material interests. This might warn those who suggest
offering material incentives for reviewers.
If we take the findings of experimental literature on cooperation seriously, it
is evident that the present situation of evaluation in science does not exploit all the
strengths of social sanctions as in other social situations where cooperation and col-
lective action are pivotal, e.g., economic markets, neighbourhood or community life
and friendship networks. The fact that science is a collective endeavour and that
scientists know it very well, should not prevent us from trying to strengthen the ex-
ploitation of social sanctions that we know reinforce cooperation.
To sum up, these experimental results allow us to understand important aspects
of the peer review puzzle. Firstly, the fact of being under evaluation by others dra-
matically increases cooperation among investors and trustees. This helps us to con-
firm that peer review is fundamental to guarantee cooperation in an interaction un-
der uncertainty and trust situations like a journal submissions’ or research proposals’
evaluation. Secondly, evaluation is effective when reputational sanction for trustees is
at its most. It is the fact that information about trustees’/authors’ cheating strategies
can circulate in the system that makes it costly for them to cheat investors/editors.
It is reasonable to argue that the same is true for evaluators/reviewers. This is a cru-
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cial point for peer review in science, since, social sanctions are poorly established:
reviewers or authors cheating editors encounter insignificant sanctions, because of
the anonymity and relatively secrecy of reviewers’ reports or authors’ submissions.
For instance, at present, unfair authors can rove from journals to journals, exploiting
reviewers’ and editors’ time, thereby causing a significant cost to the system, since
they will probably succeed in being published somewhere.
In my view, any proposal to reform these aspects, e.g., by publishing reviewers’
reports together with publications, periodically reporting the list of rejected submis-
sions, giving the chance to authors to rate reviewers and publishing results and so on,
favoured after all by electronic journal version platforms, is a necessary step toward
the improvement of peer review. This would make reviewing a more appealing activ-
ity as well, thereby strengthening reputational incentives around it.
Thirdly, of course evaluation guarantees cooperation not only for reputation-
al investment rational strategies of trustees, but also because third-party evaluation
naturally triggers a close reference to moral norms, such as “reciprocating trust” and
“avoiding others’ disapproval.” But, and this is extremely important for peer review,
the experimental literature on cooperation clearly shows that this is true because so-
cial sanctions are at their most stringent level [e.g., Gintis et al. 2005; Bowles 2008].
As I have said before, this is the weak point of peer review at present.
The point is that peer review is a fragile social mechanism undermined by in-
creasing social pressures and expectations. This understanding has been further con-
firmed by a recent and noticeable agent-based simulation model [Thurner and Hanel
2010]. These authors have developed a model that clearly shows that peer review is
a social mechanism which is extremely sensitive to perturbations caused by behav-
iour heterogeneity. In their model, it is assumed a population of N scientists playing
two roles, i.e., reviewers and authors, against N editors. They produce papers that
vary in quality according to a Gaussian distribution and can be selected as reviewers
by editors to recommend high quality submissions, with given requirements. Each
reviewer assigns a binary recommendation (accept or reject) according to five types
of behaviour: the correct (accepting good and rejecting bad submissions), the stupid
(random recommendations), the rational (not accepting submissions with a quality
higher than his/her own), the altruist (accepts all submissions), and the misanthropist
(rejects all submissions). The simulation results show that the simple presence of
10% of rational agents in the reviewers’ population drastically lowers the quality of
publications, whereas the number of altruists and misanthropists only affect the total
number of accepted papers but not the quality of the evaluation process.
If mutually favouring friendship networks are assumed, i.e., a nepotistic net-
works of scientists who tend to accept papers of co-authors, as a selection mechanism
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(i.e., scientists are likely to support similar types of research), with rational reviewers,
the increase of quality requirements by the editors lead to an adverse effect at the
system level. While correct reviewers become more selective, outperforming good
quality papers, the rational ones gain more influence by increasing the chance that
bad submissions get published. The authors’ provocative conclusion is that “under
these circumstances – which are not totally unrealistic for certain communities – a
purely random refereeing system would perform equally well, and would at the same
time save millions of man-hours spent on refereeing every year” [ibidem, 4]. Howev-
er, this is true simply because social sanctions for unfair behaviour are not present.
xConcluding Remarks
Although anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer review is an expensive
mechanism as it is a large, continuous and imperfect “social experiment” that involves
the whole scientific community. The undisputable evidence of scientific progress
over the last decades in many scientific fields, particularly those where peer review
is involved at most, should make us conclude that science essentially works. My
understanding is that this is true exactly because everyone involved in the evaluation
process do not behave merely as rational self-interest agents, but largely as moral
norm abiders. Unlike other social situations, where collective action is difficult to
achieve, scientists know very well that they are taking part in a collective endeavour.
This said, the point is that the present and future landscape of science, with
its increasing figures and pressures on peer review’s exploitation, makes it difficult
that moral foundations of this important social mechanism can be preserved, if some
reform is not undertaken [e.g., Alberts, Hanson, and Kelner 2008].
It is not a case that recently the most interesting attempts to reform peer re-
view in journals have revolved exactly around this point. For instance, the Neuro-
science Peer Review Consortium has been established in 2008 between 37 journals
that agreed to share reviewers’ reports under authors’ request. This was to speed
the publication and reduce the burden on reviewers, but the sharing of reviews was
also expected to motivate reviewers to take their task more seriously.4 The British
Medical Journal asked reviewers to sign their reports, so as to increase their sense of
responsibility. Following the idea of making peer review more transparent, The Eu-
ropean Molecular Biology Organization journal decided to publish all the anonymous





These attempts to regulate journal submissions’ evaluation in a more precise way
and to make it more transparent is expected to stimulate reviewers to work at best.
But, as Bernd Pulverer, the editor of The European Molecular Biology Organization
recently noted, these examples do not nurture and fortified peer review as much as
needed:
Most successful scientists spend a good fraction of their time reviewing papers. Yet,
there is little tangible individual credit derived from the anonymous and voluntary
contribution to this cornerstone of the research system. Thankfully, the remarkable
culture of willingness to help colleagues and journals through peer review remains
healthy, despite ever-increasing publication rates. Nevertheless, we are keenly pur-
suing means to allow funding agencies and tenure committees to take this essential
activity into account [ibidem, 31].
My purpose with this contribution was to suggest that reforms should follow
the abundant scientific knowledge that already exists on cooperation problems and
that behavioural and social sciences are definitively called to take part in this. For
this reason, it is sad to note that this topic is more investigated and disputed in the
natural rather than the social sciences. The dominant use of experimental knowledge
in natural sciences makes evidence replicability by peers a pillar of scientific progress,
so robust social evaluation are found and reinforced in the community. However, this
cannot prevent sociologists from seeing interesting social aspects in the process of
peer review and science evaluation, that could be investigated not only through quali-
tative, field and “behind the scene” observations, as well as through experimental ap-
proaches and more abstract theoretical models. In my view, this is a field where soci-
ological investigations could made a real difference, also by integrating contributions
from diverse disciplines, such as behavioural sciences, psychology and economics.
 To return to Lamont’s book, one of the most interesting parts is where she
discriminates between the evaluation modality and technologies in the US and Eu-
rope. Her argument is that anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer review
was consubstantial to the history of the United States, since a large, decentralised
and differentiated social system implied the emergence of socially shared norms that
regulated impersonal interactions. She suggests that “peer review works in a largely
anonymous system where trust and tight social control through impersonal contacts
cannot be assumed [...]. These aspects do not apply to most European countries”
[Lamont 2009, 244].
Of course this was especially true until some decades ago, before an EU market
for science was created and the globalisation of research entered the picture also at
the EU research level. But now, we can say that this difference is less important. Also
in Europe, the debate about evaluation and research productivity revolves around
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the same concepts as the US system and the emergence of an EU market weakened
the strength of national academic communities, in particular for research fund com-
petition.
Therefore, anonymous, distributed and decentralized peer review is expected
to play an increasingly crucial role everywhere as: a) research is becoming more and
more internationalized and competition among national and local scientific institu-
tions (to attract human capital and funds) is expected to increase; b) the market for
research and academic positions is becoming global, particularly in many EU coun-
tries where national budget restrictions for science urge scientists to play at a global
level; and c) funding agencies and academic institutions are increasingly attracted to-
ward research evaluation, metrics and productivity, so that these last in the future will
be more important than the in-group local seniors’ opinion for careers. This changing
landscape implies that the influence of particularistic local cliques and the national
self-reference of academic communities in Europe is expected to dramatically dimin-
ish in the future, luckily so in my view. On this point, a study that systematically
compares the US system of evaluation and Europe, as well as the features of their
academic communities, would be really welcomed.
I would like to thank Anna Carola Freschi for remarks on a draft version of the paper and Robert Coates
for the linguistic revision of the text.
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Peering Into Peer Review
Abstract: This article examines the social mechanisms behind peer review and provides a com-
plementary view to Michèle Lamont’s book, How Professors Think. It emphasizes the need
for outlook review of the entire process of evaluation in science in more general terms and
suggests the added value of modelling to investigate it. It introduces experimental findings on
the relevance of social sanctions and the counter-productive effect of economic incentives on
peer review that can support the recent debate about its reform. It illustrates the relevance of
reputational incentives to guarantee cooperation between the different figures involved in the
evaluation process.
Keywords: Peer review, third-party evaluation, laboratory experiment, investment game, Michèle
Lamont.
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